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[Separate No. 159] 



The Treaty of Ghent, and After 
By Worthington Chauncey Ford 



^[From the Proceedings of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin fbr 

1914, pages 78-106] 



Madison 
Published for the Society 




WOETHINGTON ChAUNCEY FoBD 



[Sepajrate No. 159] 



The Treaty of Ghent, and After 
By Worthington Chauncey Ford 



[From the Proceedings ot the State Historical Society of Wisconsin for 

1 9 14, pages 78—106] 



Madison 

Published for the Society 

1915 



^ :?^ :!; 



isconsin Historical Society 






The Treaty of Ghent, and After 



By Worthington Chauncey Ford 

A century of peace — a century of war, the contrast and par- 
allelism attract the student of historj'. After a hundred years 
the situation has become clear; public archives have yielded 
their secrets, and private records supply material ranging from 
the lie direct to the egotistic exaggeration of a third rate non- 
entity. Today — in three months more history has been made 
than can be interpreted in a century. The extent of territory 
involved is no greater than a century ago, but the relations of 
peoples, of nations, and of continents are immensely more com- 
plex. The foolishness of the eighteenth century is repeating 
itself in the twentieth; the ambitions of rulers, the unscrup- 
ulous acts of political adventurers, the commercial and indus- 
trial struggle for markets, the closet schemes of dreamers of 
unity of race, or of brotherhood of man, all dominated by mili- 
tarism, the rule of force — is this the summation of civilization? 
Yet no one can deny that the cause of the people has gained 
strength and definite results since 1800, and today stands higher 
than any conservative leader of England, or any disillusioned 
Jacobin of France could have predicted as among the possibili- 
ties. In this advance of popular rule the United States leads, 
and, barring most unusual accidents, the Europe of 1914 has 
established that leadership beyond all cavil. 

Yet a century ago the United States was almost a pariah 
among nations, received and encouraged by Russia alone, her- 
self classed with barbarism. The message of the French Revo- 
lution had lost itself in the overweening ambitions of a military 
despot; its force had been broken by the very factors he had 

JUL 3C '915 



The Treaty of Ghent, and After 

counted upon for success. A new people, a novel policy, and 
the extraordinary power of political fanaticism acting upon 
suddenly freed slaves to feudal institutions, had run through 
an experience which ended in defeat and humiliation. Yet 
France had more possible points of contact with the United 
States than any other nation of Europe. The great rival was 
victorious, and England's supremacy on the ocean stood un- 
questioned by any power in Europe. After more than twenty 
3'ears of Avar the Continent cried out for a peace — and by the 
irony of events, peace was about the only wish that was not 
to be gratified. 

But the United States — this people who had failed miserably 
on land against Great Britain, and had for twenty years en- 
dured the insults of Great Britain and France with a supineness 
which only increased their insolence — how did it stand? De- 
feated on land, asserting itself with notable success on the sea, 
wdth a war power as yet undeveloped, torn b.y internal dissen- 
sion and even facing disunion, its administration discredited, its 
finances on the brink of national bankruptcy, it eagerly wel- 
comed the offer of Russia's mediation, and when that had been 
rejected by England, accepted direct negotiations with its 
enemy. By rights such a people should come as suitors, beg- 
ging at the hands of Britain the right to be independent. 
Of undefined ideals, embarking upon a novel experiment in gov- 
ernment it asked for sufferance. And even the place of meet- 
ing suggested a certain dependence, for Ghent was garrisoned 
by the British. 

Between the offer of mediation and the naming of Ghent the 
military situation in Europe changed almost in a moment. 
There must be a peace because for the first time since 1792 
France and Great Britain were at one on the question. At 
Paris the four great Powers in alliance against France outlined 
an agreement for disposing of French conquests and alliances. 
A guerre de partage, a war of partition opens. The United 
States — a suggestion had been made to invite it to be repre- 
sented at an earlier congress at Prague; but why, only senti- 
ment could explain. Great Britain insisted that her war with 
the States was a family affair, with which Europe was con- 
cerned only so far as IMadison was an ally of Bonaparte. With 

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Wisconsin Historical Society 

the fall of Bonaparte that interest ceased. As to the Spanish 
American colonies, they could remain for the present — their 
commerce stood as their best asset, with Great Britain as chief 
beneficiary.^ 

What were the questions at issue between the United States 
and Great Britain? The English summed them in the obnox- 
ious words "Sailor's rights and free trade" — meaning by free 
trade that free bottoms should make free goods. To their 
)ulers, these words summed up impossibilities, monstrous claims, 
to recognize which would jeopardize the British Empire. The 
Americans summarized the matters in dispute as impressment 
of seamen, allegiance, blockades, rights of neutrals, believing 
their desires moderate, and in the interests of mankind. Great 
Britain had already served notice on Europe that no discussion 
of her maritime rights or practices would be permitted,- and 
Europe bowed to the yoke, as England was the paymaster. Not 
one of the Powers, great or little, was willing or in a position 
to aid America in questioning England on the high seas. At 
Ghent the one subject not to be brought forward was that of 
maritime policy, of which the impressment of seamen formed a 
necessary part. Weeks before the commissioners of the two 
nations met, Gallatin knew this from his conversations in Lon- 
don, and had concluded that the most favorable terms of peace 
to be expected were the status ante helium, and the postpone- 
ment of other disputes to a better season. 

So the British program concerned effects, not causes of the 
war, an Indian reservation, revision of boundaries, and the 
fishing rights or privileges. Further, as evidence of a sincere 



' In May, 1814, the Duke of Wellington suggested that in considera- 
tion for certain commercial advantages in the Spanish colonies "we 
would discourage and discountenance by every means in our power the 
rebellion in the Spanish colonies. Secondly, to promise to bind North 
America by a secret article in our treaty of peace, to give no encourage- 
ment, or countenance, or assistance, to the Spanish colonies." Duke of 
Wellington to Lord Castlereagh, May 25, 1814. Letters and Despatches 
of Lord Castlereagh, X, 44. 

^At the Conference at Chatillon, February 5, 1814, Castlereagh had 
arranged that questions about the British maritime code should be com- 
pletely banished from the discussion. See J. H. Rose, Life of Napoleon 
(New York, 1902), II, 389. 

[80] 



The Treaty of Ghent, and After 

desire for peace, a large expedition was about to sail for the 
United States under the command of Lord Hill. He publicly- 
announced his intention to humble the Yankees and quickly re- 
duce them to submission. Thus offered inadmissible demands 
on the one hand, and war on the other, naturally the American 
commissioners doubted the desire of the English for peace, and 
looked upon the subjects laid doA\Ti for discussion as intended 
merely to gain time. The British, bound by their instructions, 
and convinced of the moderation of their demands, were taken 
by surprise when the Americans without hesitation rejected 
their proposals, as naturally they entertained a like doubt of 
the intentions in America, and believed territorial conquest to 
be the real object. 

In a situation like this personality counts for much. The 
records for measuring this personality are quite full. We have 
been amused by many attempts to determine the extent of each 
factor. The five Americans represented geographical as well 
as political elements — commerce, the "West, diplomatic experi- 
ence, and the administration. Few have written on the sub- 
ject without describing the genial Clay, the solid Baj^ard, the 
explosive Adams, and the calm Gallatin. The differences among 
them, due to nature and education as well as to subject of ne- 
gotiation, are emphasized and exaggerated to make a striking 
picture. 

We might almost suppose the real peace to be made was 
among the five warring American agents. And the member 
who has left the most copious records is made to suffer the most 
in this comparison. In his Memoirs, John Quincy Adams has 
not spared himself in any respect. An infirmity of temper, 
self-admitted and under constant guard, colored his whole life, 
and the daily record gives to the Memoirs an element of confes- 
sion — the confession of a flagellant, ever accompanied with an 
exaggeration of the sin. In that record Adams found relief 
as well as repentance, and his private or family letters offer the 
needed corrective. If he found an outlet for pressure of feeling 
in his daily entries in his journal, his drafts of dispatches 
served the same useful purpose. He groans over the treatment 
given to them by his colleagues ; but half of what Gallatin wrote 
found no place in the final note, and seven-eighths of what 

6 [81] 



Wisconsin Historical Society 

Adams proposed was struck out. This was not at all strange, 
considering that the drafts of notes passed through the hands 
of each commissioner, and each was tenacious of his ideas of 
form, and substance. If Gallatin's matter received drastic 
editing, the others had no reason to complain of neglect, and 
Adams was the first to admit the advantage of the method, 
wliile crying out against the slaughter or mangling of his pe- 
riods. Gallatin's composition, he said, with truth, is argumen- 
tative, and "mine is declamatory. He is always perfectly cool, 
and I in the judgment of my colleagues am often more than 
temperately warm. The style of the papers we receive is bit- 
ter as the quintessence of wormwood — arrogant, dictatorial, in- 
sulting — and we pocket it all with the composure of the Athe- 
nian who said to his adversary, ' Strike, but hear ! ' Now in all 
this tranquillity of endurance I fully acquiesce, because it may 
be more politic to suppress than to exhibit our just indignation. 
But when I first write I indulge my own feelings, well knowing 
that the castigation my draft has to pass through will strip it 
of all its inflammable matter, * * * The result of all this is, 
that the tone of all our papers is much more tame than I should 
make it, if I were alone. * * * Mr. Gallatin keeps and in- 
creases his influence over us all. It would have been an irrepar- 
able loss if our country had been deprived of the benefits of his 
talents in this negotiation."-^ Tliat seems not only a fair but a 
generous judgment. In truth there was an excess of individu- 
ality among the American commissioners. One expects temper 
in such a condition. 

Pitted against them were three men whose abilities in nego- 
tiation were never tested. Perhaps they were never intended 
to be tested, for from the beginning to the end they served as 
messengers — receiving the American notes and sending them at 
once to London ; receiving the replies from London and leaving 
them with, the American commissioners. In no instance and 
on no point did they exercise initiative or discretion. It wag 
the French caricature of the Malmesbury mission at Lille: 
"My Lord," he was asked, "I hope your Lordship is well this 
morning. * * * Indeed, Sir, I do not know, but I will send 



* John Quincy Adams to his wife, September 27, 1814. Ms. 

[82] 



The Treaty of Ghent, and After 

a courier to my Court and inquire." Lord Gambier, of sterl- 
ing qualities, earned his peerage in the bombardment of Copen- 
hagen, in conjunction with Cathcart, now representing Great 
Britain at St. Petersburg, whence Adams had just come. His 
family connections supported him in positions for which he was 
not fitted. As he gained little glory in the navy, so he ac- 
quired no distinction as a diplomatist. Henry Goulburn, now 
a young man of thirty, was destined to spend a long life in un- 
distinguished mediocrity, serving more than forty years in 
Parliament, and filling respectably but not brilliantly many 
offices. Throughout life, when true responsibility was de- 
manded, he gave way to others, an uninspired official, oversha- 
dowed by his abler and more conspicuous colleagues. The third 
member, William Adams, was an admiralty lawyer, and admir- 
alty law then meant that barrier against all neutral commerce, 
that extreme protection of British trade, raised by Sir "William 
Scott. We are told on the unimpeachable authority of the Dic- 
tionary of National Biography that Adams' ** chief claim to 
distinction is the part he took in the negotiations for a treaty 
with the United States in 1814. * * * and [he] was entrusted 
with the sole preparation of the dispatches relating to maritime 
law, the most delicate and important part of the negotiation." 
Considering that maritime law did not figure at all in the nego- 
tiation, for the pacification of Europe seemed to make an ar- 
rangement of no immediate necessity, this claim to distinction 
becomes so shadowy as to be imponderable. But for the social 
side, the true negotiation on the British part might have been 
entrusted to the King's messengers. As the French represen- 
tatives at Prague their hands were tied, but as their mouths 
and legs were free they could walk about and dine. In reality 
the American commissioners had against them the Cabinet and 
Ministry in London. 

Yet the three British represented no mean strength when de- 
lay counted as gain. After a test in conference Adams con- 
cluded that any one of the Americans was a match for the 
brightest of the English mission; and "for extent and copious- 
ness of information, for sagacity and shrewdness of compre- 
hension, for vivacity of intellect and fertility of resource, there 
is certainly not among them a man equal to Mr. Gallatin. I 

[83] 



Wisconsin Historical Society 

doubt whether there is among them a man of the powers of the 
Chevalier [Bayard]. In all our transactions, hitherto we have 
been much indebted to the ability of both these gentlemen for 
the ascendency in point of argument which we have constantly 
maintained over our antagonists."^ That was written early in 
September. More than three months later, after many trying 
episodes Adams wrote: "Of the five members of the Ameri- 
can mission the Chevalier has the most perfect control of his 
tnmper, the most deliberate coolness; and it is the more meri- 
torious because it is real self-command. His feelings are as 
quick, and his spirit as high as those of any one among us ; but 
he certainly has them more under government. I can scarcely 
express to you how much both he and Mr. Grallatin have risen 
in my esteem since we have been here, living together. Mr. 
Gallatin has not quite so constant a supremacy over his own 
emotions; yet he seldom yields to an ebullition of temper, and 
recovers from it immediately. * * * He has in his character 
one of the most extraordinary combinations of stubbornness and 
flexibility that I ever met with in man. His greatest fault I 
think to be an ingenuity sometimes intrenching upon ingenu- 
ousness." Clay, this severe critic of self thought resembled 
himself, as under the influence of irritability. "There is the 
same dogmatical, overbearing manner, the same harshness of 
look and expression, and the same forgetfulness of the courte- 
sies of society in both. An impartial person judging between 
tliem I think would say that one has the strongest, and the other 
the most cultivated understanding; that one has the most ar- 
dency, and the other the most experience of mankind ; that one 
has a mind more gifted by nature, and the other a mind less 
cankered by prejudice. Mr. Clay is by ten years the younger 
man of the two, and as such has perhaps more claim to indulg- 
ence for iri'itability. "^ 

At so great a distance from their government as to make con- 
sultation and timely instructions out of the question; without a 
single supporter of their claims in Europe; and with the tide 
of military events in America drifting all in favor of their 
enemy, the situation of the American commissioners called for 



' IMd, September 9, 1814. Ms. 
'^lUd, December 16, 1814. Ms. 



[84] 



The Treaty of Ghent, and After 

truly superior qualities. Even his bitterest enemies admitted 
Gallatin's abilities, worldly in their aims but showing a cer- 
tainty of insight and a rare degree of diplomatic finesse which 
made him a leader of men. He gained his ends by directness 
and sheer mastery; and he won victory by inspiring confidence 
in his fairness and balanced judgment. In contrast Adams is 
generally placed, the Puritan and uncompromising advocate, of 
quick temper and harsh speech, the maker of enemies, and the 
spirit of opposition. I make no plea against this generally ac- 
cepted verdict; but feel that it is based upon partial — though 
his own — statements, and may be modified by other evidence. 
If Gallatin's character and abilities are admitted, and they are 
not open to question, is it not suggestive that Gallatin and 
Adams are almost invariably found standing together, and 
against their colleagues? The two men had not been thrown 
together in politics, a conmiou bond of ambition; but their first 
association occurred under the trying climate and conditions of 
St. Petersburg. Particularly trying to Gallatin, for after 
months of waiting he learned that the Senate had refused to 
confirm him in the mission, a rebuff as personal as it was un- 
deserved ; less trying to Bayard, who chafed under the long and 
to him inexplicable delay under the offer of mediation ; perhaps 
equally so to Adams, who, as the accredited minister to the Rus- 
sian court, was the recognized channel of communication with 
the Emperor, and who bore with the discontent of his col- 
leagues. Yet when Gallatin left St. Petersburg in March, a 
discredited and disappointed commissioner, it was not mere 
words of form he used in writing to Adams: "Permit me to 
add that I am happy to have made your acquaintance, and to 
have learned how to appreciate your merit ".*^ This association 
in St. Petersburg, Ghent, and London, laid the foundation of 
mutual esteem between the two men, which continued to the 
end." A spirit of generous recognition found wanting in Clay 

"March 6, 1814. Ms. "Both the Adamses were the purest men and 
the most earnest searchers after truth the United States ever had. 
What they say is often indiscreet, but their actions, never. They are 
always open to conviction." Gallatin to Lieber in 1832. Life and 
Letters of Francis Lieber (Boston, 1882), 96. 

' James Gallatin, secretary to his father, in July, at St. Petersburg, 
noted: "Mr. Adams very civil— but has a disagreeable manner. He 

[85] 



Wisconsin Historical Society 

and Russell controlled them. Clay and Russell indulged in 
criticism of their colleagues shameless in its extreme littleness.* 
Bayard had the good fortune to die somewhat in tlie light of 
martyrdom. 

Ghent did not promise many amusements to its visitors, now 
of some number, as the commissioners were eagerly approached 
and^ closely watched by the many British and Americans who 
sought openly commercial gain from the issue. July 4, inci- 
dentally celebrated by an impromptu toast to Bayard, offered 
the first diversion; but a stream of titled notables, from Czar 
to princeling, returning from the conference in London, pro- 
duced a stage effect of some interest. With the courage of 
their present feelings of harmony the five Americans deter- 
mined to live in one house and have a common table; and this 
they obtained from one who kept a shop of millinery, perfum- 
ery, prints, and drawings. He possessed the further advantage 
of having been bred a cook, so he united the offices of landlord 
and purveyor. A short experience developed unlovely traits. 
He had not furnished the house completely and elegantly, ac- 
cording to the agreement, and though well paid he required a 
scolding once or twice a week to make him provide even toler- 
able fare. Who knows if indigestion did not play a part in in- 
ducing the irritability so much dwelt upon by the picturesque 
historians ? 

The first conferences and notes in the mission produced mu- 
tual surprises. It was due not to the demands on the one hand, 
and the prompt rejection on the other, so much as to the cool 
measuring of either side under the smooth words of formal diplo- 
macy. Goulburn admitted that he found an unexpected can- 
dor and openness in the Americans, and believed that he and 
his colleagues had shown restraint in passing over the openings 
given by their opponents for sharp retorts. Had he seen or 
heard the comments of the Americans on the proposals and the 
manner of making them, his self-complacency would have been 



is from New England — a 'Yankee.' " In December he wrote: "Mr. 
Adams has shown great kindness to me; at first I did not like him, 
but now will be sorry when we part." Diary in Scribner's Magazine, 
LVI, 352, 357. 
* See Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, XLIV, 308. 

[86] 



The Treaty of Ghent, and After 

rudely shaken. The British demands were inadmissible in 
themselves, and were placed with brutal directness — you must 
take them, or continue the war. They left no opening for dis- 
cussion, and were never intended to be discussed. In a few 
days Castlereagh, premier of the Cabinet, passed through 
Ghent on his way to Vienna, but saw none of the American mis- 
sion. He gave new suggestions to his agents, who were on the 
following day, as Adams notes, "charged fourfold with obnox- 
ious substance." An exchange of written notes followed, and a 
break seemed inevitable, a matter of a few hours. Castlereagh 
subsequently admitted that the British commissioners had pur- 
sued a wrong course, though acting under their instructions; 
offering the Americans an advantage. The American reply to 
their note he thought impudent and capable of an irresistible 
answer. Liverpool had never read a paper more easy to refute. 
But to break on such demands would unite America. An ir- 
reconcilable difference faced those at Ghent, and both parties 
saw only one termination to the business — no peace and fur- 
ther war. A single word, and all conference, friendly or other- 
wise, would come to an end. Only an engagement to dine with 
the British prevented the Americans from dispersing, for not 
one entertained a hope of further negotiation. 

At the dinner, the hosts entertained "as courteously as could 
be expected". A spat occurred between Bayard and the Eng- 
lish Adams, the former a sportsman describing a new fowling 
piece, primed by one grain of fulminating powder, price fifty 
guineas. "The Doctor thought that no fowling piece could be 
called good for anything that cost more than five guineas. He 
hinted to the Chevalier that his fifty guinea musket was a gini- 
crack — a philosophical whimsey, better for shooting a problem 
than a partridge; and he was as liberal of his sarcasms upon 
philosophy as he could have been, if delivering a dissertation 
upon gunboats and dry-docks. The choice of the person upon 
whom this blunderbuss of law discharged its volley of ridicule 
against philosophy diverted us all, and you may judge how 
much it delighted our colleague of the Treasury [Gallatin]. 
The Chevalier pronounces our namesake to be a man of no 
breeding. "■' Adams himself, after raising the question of a 

•John Quincy Adams to his wife, August 30, 1814. Ms. 

[87] 



Wisconsin Historical Society 

common ancestry, willingly allowed the question to drop, sat- 
isfied that there could be nothing in common between his family 
and that of the Welshman bearing the same name. 

But the diplomatic game had not been played and the British 
had no intention of giving their adversaries so advantageous 
grounds for making the war popular in America. Cession of 
territory, abandonment of the lakes, practical disannament — 
were they dictating to a conquered people? Despise your 
enemy as you may, an insult is often of greater efficacy in arous- 
ing spirited opposition than a defeat in the field. The inter- 
change of notes settling nothing continued, and the Americans 
gained confidence because the British had not broken with them, 
when none of them had the slightest doubt that a break had been 
deliberately intended. Time favored the British, for at anv 
moment they might win a decisive Adctory on land, and rest in 
a position to say on what terms peace could be purchased." 

From the press of that time few items of value can be gar- 
nered. On the continent a free press did not exist, and even at 
Ghent the press gave little notice to what was passing beyond the 
exchange of visits by the commissioners. The English papers 
were better served by correspondents, occasional and at times 
anonymous, by speculators' agents eager for news to affect 
the market. The false as well as the true would serve this 
purpose, and the proportion of falsehood far surpassed that of 
truth. The ministerial papers were the greatest sinners, but 
the opposition in its efforts to be fairer to the cause of peace 
was quite as outspoken against the American position. At times 
a bit of humor resulted. There was the standing charge of 
Madison's alliance with Napoleon, with whom he was believed 
to be in constant and friendly correspondence. The influence 
of Russia was believed to overshadow the early meetings of the 
commissioners, and rumor persistently asserted that a Russian 
commissioner would attend and direct the course of the Ameri- 
can mission. The day came— September 15— when two dis- 
tinguished strangers, apparently of very high rank, aceom- 

"The Cabinet played for delay, believing their notes would be re- 
ferred to Washington and in the meantime every point on the Canadian 
frontier needed to be retained would be captured. Liverpool to Castle- 
reagh, September 2, 1814. 

[88] 



The Treaty of Ghent, and After 

panied by the Intendant of the city, entered the hotel of the 
Americans. Almost at the same moment the British commis- 
sioners and secretaries arrived. All doubts were at an end ; the 
strangers were the expected Russian mediators. Expresses 
were sent to London and Liverpool with the intelligence, cot- 
ton and tobacco the object. Alas! The distinguished strangers 
were representatives of the Sovereign Prince of Holland, mak- 
ing a visit of ceremony. The ruffled market resumed its mo- 
notonous character, journalistic pride was satisfied, and the im- 
possible, as is not unusual, had not happened. Russia gave no 
weight in the negotiation in favor of the United States. 

No reassuring note came from the military operations in the 
United States. In the face of active preparations in England 
for a crushing campaign by sea and by land, the helplessness of 
the United States to meet it seemed beyond question. More 
than ever America stood alone. From St. Petersburg the com- 
missioners were told that the question of maritime rights would 
not be raised at Vienna; and from Paris, they learned that if 
the desired policy of a strict neutrality was departed from, it 
would take action against the claims of the United States. 
From England only threats of war's terrors came from press 
and officials. "In short," said the Courier, September 21, 1814, 
"the whole coast [of the United States] is one scene of alarm and 
apprehension. This is as it shquld be. ' ' Six days later the 
news of the destruction of the public buildings in Washington 
reached England — a practical lecture, which, it was believed, 
would dispose the Americans to an immediate peace upon the 
British terms. The British jubilation was loud, but Welling- 
ton noted that the intelligence of this achievement increased 
the ill-temper and rudeness shown to the British in Paris, and 
complained that the public press of that city, though wholly 
under control of the government, canvassed the incident in a 
very unfair manner. His position was suggestive, for he de- 
spised the continental press. At this very time Liverpool was 
writing of the moderation of the British proposals at Ghent, 
and of the Ministry's willingness to let Madison remain in of- 
fice because of his weakness and his probable readiness to make 
peace for the purpose of getting out of his difficulties. 

Two months of apparently fruitless negotiation would tell 
upon the best of natures. Goulbura somewhat tactlessly told 

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Wisconsin Historical Society 

Gallatin he relied upon his good sense and could treat with him, 
as he "was not the least like an American ".^^ The son, who 
overheard the intended compliment, said he did not know if his 
father was pleased or not. Adams wrote to Crawford (October 
5) that he had never for an instant believed that peace was prac- 
ticable, and that Clay was the only commissioner who had oc- 
casionally entertained hopes that it might be. 

That Clay's optimism, most active when his colleagues were 
most depressed, offered a relief from their gloomy forecasts has 
been much dwelt upon. Though a personal asset, it was not a 
factor in the situation. Clay was throughout life much of a 
dreamer, and his performance savors of a natural exuberance 
of temper rather than of political insight. The Presidency and 
the elections of 1816 — even in the hours of anxious waiting at 
Ghent the subject was not far away in the minds of some of the 
Commissioners, and Clay showed greater disappointment and 
apprehension at the final treaty than all his colleagues to- 
gether. Both Clay and Russell thought that Gallatin, "whose 
origin prescribes him in the honest prejudices of the nation", 
intended, so far as his influence availed, to confer the Presi- 
dency upon Adams, "a kind of laborious pedant, without judg- 
ment enough to be useful, or taste sufficient to be admired. "^- 
But Clay alone feared the effect of the treaty upon his own po- 
litical hopes. 

Among the curiosities of record, however, must be placed the 
outpouring of confidence by the staidest member of the mis- 
sion— Baj^ard. After the dinner given to the members of the 
two missions by the Intendant of the city he took Goulbum 
aside and entertained, if not puzzled, that gentleman by a dis- 
quisition on parties in the United States, their views and objects, 
the grounds on which they had hitherto proceeded, and the ef- 
fect which a hostile or conciliatory disposition on the part -of 
Great Britain might have upon them. He inculcated how 
much it was for her interest to support the Federalists, and if 



" Goulburn expressed the same idea to Bathurst, that he found Galla- 
tin alone of the American commissioners "in any degree sensible, and 
this perhaps arises from his being less like an American than any of 
his colleagues". September 23, 1814. 

" Mass. Hist. Soc. Proceedings, XLIV, 311. 

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The Treaty of Ghent, and After 

impossible demands prevented peace, the party of which he was a 
member would be sacrificed to their adversaries." On Castle- 
reagh such a post-prandial confidence produced its effect. 
Knowing what party government involved, he thought the va- 
rieties of party represented in the mission would prevent its 
agreeing to any measure of responsibility, not to add the im- 
perfect security that if they did agree their act would receive 
approval at home.^* Bayard's openness was said to have been 
imitated by other of the Americans, with the result of convinc- 
ing Goulburn that the Federalists were quite as inveterate 
enemies of Great Britain as the Madisonians. Yet the English 
bureaucrat looked upon the British notes and the demands em- 
bodied in them as likely to make a considerable impression on 
the "reasonable people" in the United States. The result of 
such a campaign of education would have disappointed a less 
self-centeretl schoolmaster. A Cockburn proved a more cap- 
able developer of national opinion, quite as capable in that di- 
rection as the best of political propagandists — George Canning. 
It may be doubted if either master had reason to be gratified by 
the results. 

If the earlier notes of the British bore evidence of having 
been suggested in Downing Street; the later were wholly made 
there. Beginning with the instructions calculated even now to 
awaken amazement by the demands they embodied, the high 
tone continued but in diminishing terms to the end. If the first 
dne qua non laid down by the English offered no difficulty for 
returning a decided negative, the subsequent notes rasped by 
the arrogance of tone natural to the English diplomat. Adams 
resented the ' ' domineering and insulting style ' ', and would re- 
tort in kind; but quickly recognized an altered procedure on 
the part of the adversary. The British note of October 8, bear- 
ing the Cabinet stamp, contained "much more show of argu- 
ment, falsehoods less liable to immediate and glaring exposure, 
misrepresentations more sheltered from instant detection, and 
sophistry generally more plausible than they had thought it 
worth while to take the trouble of putting into the former 



'" Goulburn to Bathurst, August 23, 1814. 
" Castlereagh to Liverpool, August 28, 1814. 

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notes. "^^ But a decided concession had been made, and the 
English had yielded on the most important issue, offering an 
opening for further negotiation, or rather determining whether 
there should be any negotiation at all. 

If delay told in favor of the British in America, it told in fa- 
vor of the Americans at Ghent, where they gained the good will of 
the people. An English garrison occupied the city, and no oc- 
cupation involving quartering on houses and levying of tribute 
is popular. Much as the continent owed to Great Britain for 
aid in overthrowing Napoleon, the English exhibited qualities 
that made them generally disliked and often hated." In the 
actual case two sentinels in scarlet always stood at the door of 
the building of the English plenipotentiaries; the regiments in 
occupation demanded food from the inhabitants of the city ; and 
the Ghent merchants complained of the competition caused by 
the rush of British manufactures into the newly opened mar- 
kets of the continent. Personally, too, the English commis- 
sioners made little effort to conciliate this hostile feeling. They 
lived as secluded as the old monks of the Chartreux where they 
resided, and Lord Gambler, nearly three months after coming to 
Ghent, plaintively admitted that the acquaintance of himself 
and colleagues was confined to the family of the city's Inten- 
dant. 

The Americans, on the other hand, had made themselves 
agreeable, and on September 29 had given a tea and card party 
which ended in a ball, and about one hundred and thirty of the 
principal noblesse and merchants attended. The garden was 
illuminated by colored lamps, and here is what Adams wrote 
of it: "The elderly ladies and gentlemen had cards and the 
young people danced. The ball was tres anime, and finished 
with a romping Boulang^re at three in the morning. * * * Mr. 
Gallatin and myself were, as Boyd says, the ringleaders. We 
had never seen and knew not the names of about half the com- 
pany, but they all appeared to be highly pleased with their en- 



"John Quincy Adams to his wife, October 11, 1814. Ms. 

""[The British] are hated everywhere, and I think that we begin 
to grow popular." Gallatin to Monroe, October 26, 1814. Writings of 
Oallatin, I, 643, 

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The Treaty of Ghent, and After 

tertainment. Our garden was illuminated, and at a central 
gate was the following inscription : 

Gand voudroit dans ses murs 
Voir, par un desir sincere, 
Regler les destins futurs 
De I'Amerique et I'Angleterre. 
Puisse enfin I'arbre de Pallas 
Fleurir sur le sol des deux mondes 
Ah! sur la terre et sur Tonde, 
Repose toi, Dieu des combats!" 

None of the English mission attended. 

The social advance bore fruit, and as winter approached the 
Americans were offered much social attention, as much as the 
gayest of the mission could wish. Weekly subscription con- 
certs and redout es or balls began in November, and the Ameri- 
can commission had a box at the theater, with three or four 
performances each Aveek. The company was French, and ac- 
cording to Adams, who had seen much of the European theaters, 
' ' without exception the worst I ever saw. There is but one tol- 
erable actor, and not one actress in the whole troupe. Occa- 
sionally they have had one good singer, male, but he had a fig- 
ure like Sancho Panza ; and one female, but she was sixty years 
old and had lost her teeth. Sometimes they bring out rope 
dancers and sometimes dancers without ropes, who are ramb- 
ling about the country, and half fill the houses two or three 
nights; but the standards of the stage are the veriest histrionic 
rabble that my eyes ever beheld. Yet they have a very good 
orchestra of instrumental performers, very decent scenery, and 
a sufficient variety' of it; and a wardrobe of elegant and even 
magnificent dresses. * * * Some of us are very constant at- 
tendants. jMr. Gallatin and James never miss. They have be- 
come intimatel.y acquainted with the whole troupe. All our 
family have become in a manner domesticated behind the scenes, 
with a single exception. Who that is you may conjecture."^* 

Then a company of English strolling players drifted to 
Ghent, and after playing three times solicited the permission to 



'' John Quincy Adams to his wife, September 30, 1814. Ms. 
"/ftifZ, November 15, 1814. Ms. 



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advertise themselves as performing under the patronage of the 
American mission. Their plea was that it would prove the best 
expedient for filling the house. The request was declined, but 
a subscription of five napoleons for five seats was paid. The 
players wound up the night's performance by singing God 
Save the King, with its prayer "Scatter his enemies". Had 
this been under the patronage of the Americans, the scene 
would have been humorous. A few days later at a concert the 
program announced "Hail Columbia, Air americain a grand 
orchestre". The Hanoverian officers received an order from 
authority to leave the hall when that air was played; but for- 
tunately the order was revoked during the evening. The air 
became popular and the manner of introducing it deserves men- 
tion. The Americans were asked if there was a national air. 
' ' Oh yes ! there was Hail Columbia ! Had any of us got it noted ? 
No. Could any body sing or play it? This was an embarrass- 
ing question. But Peter, Mr. Gallatin's black man could 
ivMstle it, and whistle it he did ; and one of the musicians of the 
city noted it from Peter's whistling; and Hughes then remem- 
bered that he could scrape it, tant Men que Trial, upon the fiddle, 
and he could sing some verses of it when he was alone. And 
from these elements the tune was made out, and partitioned, 
and announced as Vmr national de Americanis a grand or- 
chestre, and now it is everywhere played as a counterpart to 
God save the King. "^^ 

November came. The commissioners had overcome the diffi- 
culties of the preliminaries, and were ready to proceed with a 
treaty. Points of etiquette arose from time to time, of little 
importance in themselves, but dear to the formalist, who found 
behind them protection from that too great exertion which of- 
ten commits him to entangling concessions. At this point, when 
it became necessary to take a view of the entire field of nego- 
tiation, the harmony existing among the American commission- 
ers was threatened. Perfect unanimity could hardly be ex- 
pected, for enough matter of controversy remained to awaken 
any latent sectional feeling among the envoys. In clearing the 
ground of inadmissible claims and demands, in passing over top- 
ics eliminated from even a perfunctory discussion, the field was 



^nUd, January 24, 1815. Ms. 

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The Treaty of Ghent, and After 

narrowed, but attention became concentrated upon the un- 
settled questions with an intensity auguring ill for any agree- 
ment. Cataloguing the points to be covered, the project of a 
treaty was sent to the British commissioners November 10. 
From inadmissible propositions the English had passed to the 
principle of uti possidetis, hardly less acceptable to the Ameri- 
cans, because it involved a cession of territory. Now the Ameri- 
cans offered the status ante helium for all subjects of dispute 
between the two countries leaving all else to future and pacific 
discussion. This proposition originated in Adams, was not at 
that time authorized by their instructions, and had been ac- 
cepted only after a severe contest with Clay.^" The time the 
project was delivered to the British gave food for reflection. 
Sir Edward Pakenham had sailed to America with large rein- 
forcements, urged to make such an impression on the Yankees 
as would compel them to sue for peace. The British exchequer 
faced that trying moment when Parliament must be asked to 
give very large sums for measures the value of which hung in 
the balance. Policy, party or national, takes on queer aspects 
to the burdened taxpayer when expressed in pounds, shillings, 
and pence. On November 8 the Prince Regent had expressed 
a desire for peace, but the discussions in Parliament, controlled 
by the Ministry, indicated a desire rather to await military suc- 
cesses in America and diplomatic vantage at Vienna, and to 
frame the peace accordingly. 

While the negotiation stood in this somewhat ticklish position, 
there came one of those novelties in diplomacy which gave a 
shock to the old school. In September the American commis- 
sioners had sent by the "John Adams" an account of their first 
conferences with the British envoys and the proposals by them 
laid down as a sine qua non to any treaty. The ship reached 
New York early in October, and the dispatches, giving little 
expectation of a favorable issue, were at once laid before Con- 
gress and published. The effect in the United States could not 
have been happier, for the claims of the British tended to bring 
all factions into a determination to push the war. But in Eu- 
rope the result was dramatically different. 



^ "Mr. Clay -would not assent to any thing." James Gallatin's Diary, 
October 30, 

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The papers submitted to Congress by the President reached 
London on Saturday, November 19, and were reprinted in all 
the journals as "most important".'^ The ministerial organ be- 
lieved the negotiations at an end ; the press of the opposition 
could not "compliment their negotiators upon their adroitness 
or skill". The one asserted that the British claims were just; 
the other that those demands had been so unfortunately ex- 
pressed as to give an impression that much more would be re- 
quired. In private Liverpool spoke of Madison's scandalous 
action in making this communication of papers and charged the 
President with falsehood. In Parliament the same minister 
stated that the government did not intend to follow the unjusti- 
fiable example of America, "in the unprecedented proceeding 
of publishing a partial and garbled account of the commence- 
ment of a negotiation still pending." Lansdowne very prop- 
erly suggested that if the American papers were partial, they 
made it necessary for the government to counteract the mis; 
chievous effects likely to result in Europe as well as in Ameri- 
ca. For his part, the papers proved that the principle on which 
the war had been commenced had been utterly changed. It was 
no longer a war for a principle vital to national existence, said 
the Earl of Donoughmore. but one of their own aggrandisement, 
and the destruction of the American naval frontier. In the 
House Baring spoke of the "extraordinary pretensions" raised 
in the British mission, based upon ignorance of the public feel- 
ing in America, and calculated to unite that country against 
Great Britain ; but the debate drifted into a futile discussion on 
the power of Congress or the President to cede territory. When 
the British Commissioners at Ghent learned of the publication, 
such Avas their indignation that Gallatin thought they would 
break the negotiations. Yet as in the X. Y. Z. mission open di- 
plomacy scored a real victory over secret. 

By the end of November the points at issue had been reduced 
to so few in number and so unimportant in nature as to make 
peace all but assured. What remained, unimportant as they 
were, involved points of national honor ; it was as impossible to 
cede a few hundred acres of national territory as a principality ; 



-'They appeared in the Courier, November 19 and 21; and in the 
Morning Chronicle, November 21. 

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The Treaty of Ghent, and After 

and the American commissioners were by no means agreed on 
the final stand to make. The fisheries and the Mississippi 
proved a source of constant bickering and discussion, especially 
between Clay and Adams. Even Gallatin's tact and patience 
threatened to fail. 

More than that Adams' pride in country received a severe 
shock by the proceedings of the IMassachusetts legislature in ap- 
pointing delegates to the Hartford Convention. Convinced as 
he was that the extreme Federalists had meditated and plotted 
disunfon since 1804, the conduct of New England during the 
war and this evidence of settled opposition to the measures of 
the national administration seemed unquestionable proof of his 
fears.-- The "demon of disunion" haunted him at a time when 
he was struggling to maintain the rights and liberties of Massa- 
chusetts under the treaty of 1783. The difterences between the 
commissioners had been narrowed to this: the fisheries, the 
navigation of the Mississippi, the boundary, and certain small 
islands in Passamaquoddy Bay. Three of these questions spe- 
cially concerned Massachusetts, and Adams stood as the cham- 
pion of Massachusetts. To learTi that the State was at this time 
entering into what he could only interpret as a scheme of sepa- 
ration from the Union, embittered his heart. To select a time 
of national distress for such a "mad and Avicked project of na- 
tional suicide", gave aid and comfort to the enemy. 

An influence now intervened of which nothing was suspected 
until a few weeks ago the Gallatin diary gave the evidence. 
That the Cabinet wished the Duke of Wellington to take the 
command in America has been known ; as well as his rejection 
of the offer and the reasons given. With calm force he told his 
masters they could not rightly claim territory in America by 
conquest, and advised peace. He went further, and wrote di- 
rect to Gallatin saying he was urging peace and believed it to 
be at hand. Gallatin's reply can only be conjectured; it must 



" Liverpool counted upon this movement to secure a ratification of 
the peace. "The disposition to separate on the part of the Eastern 
States may likewise frighten Madison ; for if he should refuse to ratify 
the treaty, we must immediately propose to make a separate treaty 
with them, and we have good reason to believe that they would not be 
indisposed to listen to such a proposal." To Castlereagh, December 23, 
1814. 

7 [97] 



Wisconsin Historical Society 

have been favorable. Wellington again wrote pledging his sup- 
port, and praising Gallatin's moderation and sense of justice; 
but as a foreigner, fighting for the peace of his adopted country. 
This time, the son adds, his father was pleased to be called a 
foreigner.-^ 

Undoubtedly Wellington's influence was powerful and exerted 
pressure in the best manner. The Cabinet faced heavy peace 
expenditures and, if war continued, a renewal of the unpopular 
"property tax". The winter of 1813-14, the longest and se- 
verest for forty years, had a bad effect upon grain crops; and 
ntither shipping nor manufactures were reaping the profits ex- 
pected from the reopening of continental Europe to British 
trade. The war with America had never become popular, and 
Avas now described as that "miserable little war". Even under 
a Tory government the popular feeling made itself felt, and 
gave the ministers great anxiety for the future. To tax the 
people for a new boundary in Canada, to continue a war for no 
good reason of empire, would invite overthrow, the worst of all 
punishments, Avhen families ruled and individuals swayed na- 
tions. The instructions to Ghent imposed peace, and the com- 
missioners reluctantly obeyed — Goulburn the most reluctantly 
of all. 

In December couriers between London and Ghent were more 
frequent, owing to the much increased interest in the outcome 
of the negotiation. The newspapers printed contradictory re- 
ports, based upon letters from Ghent, and noted the more fre- 
quent meetings of the Cabinet. With this constant watch upon 
their proceedings, the commissioners at Ghent permitted not a 
word or even look to escape them capable of interpretation. 
Tlie rumors of the street, the reports of the interested, the am- 
biguous sentences in foreign journals, and the naval and mili- 



" James Gallatin's Diary, November 28 and December 12. It is re- 
markable that Gallatin never confided the fact of these letters to his 
colleagues on the mission ; more remarkable that he concealed it from 
Madison and Monroe. The extracts given by the son place the fact 
beyond dispute. Liverpool knew as early as November 4 that Welling- 
ton was anxious for peace with America, if it could be had on terms at 
all honorable. It was proposed to give Wellington the military com- 
mand with power to negotiate a peace. The suggestion is a reminder 
of the peace commission of 1776. 

[98] 



The Treaty of Ghent, and After 

tary preparations gave little real food to the hungry. In fact 
nothing was known; the secret was remarkably well kept, and 
the funds rose and fell without cause, too uncertain a barometer 
to measure any but the idle thought of the speculator. Betting 
became active — on December 9 £25 to receive £100 if the pre- 
liminaries were signed on or before January 1 ; seven days 
later, 30, 35, and 40 guineas to return £100 on the same event; 
and some more venturesome sports wagered £10 to receive £100 
if peace were made known before twelve o'clock that night.^* 
On Saturday, December 24, the Courier gave the information 
"that the proceedings at Ghent afforded no prospect of an ami- 
cable issue"; on the 27th it announced the signing of the peace. 
"Wagers had risen to 75 guineas to receive 100, the market was in 
a hurricane, even before the authoritative announcement. In 
twenty-four hours calm returned, and with a sigh of relief all 
save the speculators agreed that not one cause existed for con- 
tinuing the war. That in reality had been the situation for 
months. New Orleans came as a woeful echo. 

Thus ended the Ghent negotiation. The real causes of the 
war received no mention in the treaty; the settlement of dis- 
puted points raised by the war was postponed. But peace and 
a peaceful solution of controversies had been obtained, in itself 
a triumph. The course of the negotiation had run as usual; 
mutual distrust and suspicion, a belief that either party pro- 
posed insidiously and labored to deceive, and a common inter- 
pretation of demands and argument as arrogant and insolent. 
Outwardly courteous, with occasional evidences of the bully or 
the pettifogging lawyer, the commissioners had met, discussed, 
and fought to good purpose. If the British enjoyed greater 
harmony among themselves, it is because of the insignificance 
of their labors : of what passed in the Cabinet councils in Lon- 
don we know nothing. The disputes among the Americans, na- 
tural because of the heavy responsibilities laid upon them, did 
not delay or really endanger the successful issue one hour. Pa- 
triots all, no essential could divide them ; in the presence of the 
British they were unanimous. 

Further, it made a lasting peace. Suppose the war had con- 



'* Morning Journal, December 9, 1814. 

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Wisconsin Historical Society 

tinned, would not either side have become convinced of the 
rooted and vindictive animosity of the other? No reasonable 
cause for carrying on hostilities remained, and the unreason- 
able causes must rest upon territorial greed or the blindness to 
national interest w^hich war is so apt to pervert into madness. 
In either event the feelings engendered would be of hate and 
revenge. 

Out of this ordeal the Americans emerged with much in- 
creased prestige. They had fought as single-handed in nego- 
tiation as they had in field or on the sea. The British commis- 
sioners Avere informed each day of what the great powers were 
doing, or intended to do. Not one of these powers so much as 
sent a single message of aid or hope to the American negotiators. 
Gallatin believed all continental Europe desired the war be- 
tween the United States and Great Britain to continue. For 
the United States they cared nothing; but they rejoiced to have 
England occupied elsewhere and eventually weakened. With 
this neglect and feeling among the rulers, the public opinion of 
Europe was decidedly in favor of America.^^ 

I have dwelt upon the lighter side of this negotiation, for it 
offers a relief to the daily news of civilized butchery we read. 
The negotiation at Ghent represents the best of American di- 
plomacy — the issues were clear, and the conduct fearless; the 
negotiators were able, and their harmony under the circum- 
stances extraordinary. Traditions of European diplomacy were 
broken, but that has come to be the traditional method of Ameri- 
can diplomacy. The treaty ended a war which had lost an ob- 
jective; it ended it without the sacrifice of a single right due to 
the United States. The position of the American commissioners 
was entirely correct, and had been maintained under trying con- 
ditions. For a Avonder the treaty satisfied both peoples, and 
nine months later Gallatin noticed that British antipathy and 
prejudices against America had been modified; and in spite of 
the access of pride occasioned by English success on the Conti- 
nent of Europe, further rupture Avas improbable. Peace with 
the United States had become good policy.-'' 



-** Gallatin to Monroe, December 25, 1814. Writmgs of Gallatin, I, 645. 
■"lUd, September 4, 1815. Adams, Writings of Gallatin, I, 650. 

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The Treaty of Ghent, and After 

While the Ghent eonmiission labored for peace, another con- 
gress of negotiators assembled in November at Vienna. Impe- 
rial pomp and circumstance threw around it the glamor of a 
theater; the number and high repute of the performers at- 
tracted the eyes of Christendom; the questions to be settled 
were those incident to a vulgar distribution of spoils. Fried- 
rich von Gentz, the secretary of the Congress, in almost brutal 
frankness tells us that this was the object of that assembly. 
"The grand phrases of 'reconstruction of social order', 'regen- 
eration of the political system of Europe', 'a lasting peace 
founded on a just division of strength', etc., etc., were uttered to 
tranquilise the people, and to give an air of dignity and gran- 
deur to this solemn assembly; but the real purpose of the Con- 
gress was to divide amongst the conquerors the spoils taken from 
the vanquished."-^ Peace, so ardently longed for by all Eu- 
rope, exhausted by its sufferings under Napoleonic ambitions, 
had been secured, it was believed, by the abdication of Napo- 
leon, and the creation of the toy kingdom on Elba, The com- 
mon enemy of Europe left an intestate estate, the origin of dis- 
cord for more than a century. A general peace — an universal 
peace, and at least a partial disarmament — prayed for by the 
people, was a "political poem", the dream of such an imprac- 
tical thinker as Inunanuel Kant.-** 

To the Congress of Vienna each nation or dependency sent 
its ablest men. Four powers controlled the objects of the Con- 
gress — Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia — the order 
of importance would be difficult to fix. Being allies, they were 
fairly agreed in the face of Napoleon, and at dagger's point 
when a question of self-interest arose. The conquests and de- 
pendencies of France offered the spoils, to be divided as ruth- 
lessly and with as little regard to justice or race as a cargo of 
slaves from Africa on the auction block. "Wlien Talleyrand, 
the representative of the Bourbons imposed upon France by 
the powers, called for a cessation of the spirit of revolution, and 
the guarding of all legitimate rights as sacred, he spoke from the 
bitter experience and situation of France. When he demanded 



-= Memoir of February 12, 1815. Metternich, Memoirs (New York, 
1880-82), ir, 553. 
^ His "Project of a perpetual Peace" appeared in 1806. 

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the condemnation of all ambition, or unjust enterprise, he rec- 
ognized that he was one of the Forty Thieves, with^ nothing to 
gain in the division. And by raising the issue of legitimacy 
and seeking to protect the smaller states he restored the prestige 
of France in the councils of Europe. This in spite of his char- 
acter and career. A country dance of the period bore his 
name — the Talleyrand, and the measures described the progress 
of his political life: change sides — cast off — back again — down 
tlie middle — and change sides again. 

A real and permanent equilibrium of states — the words have 
a strange sound when tested by a century of European liistory. 
In the Congress of Vienna Great Britain had nothing to ask, for 
she had already obtained all she desired. She threw her influ- 
ence in uniting Prussia and Austria against the growth of Rus- 
sia. Russia demanded the Duchy of Warsaw, one of those 
quasi independent states, touching upon the borders of three 
great powers, each one scheming to get the whole or a part for 
itself. Austria, suspicious of Prussia, somewhat fearful of Rus- 
sia, and jealous of French influence in Italy, received only a 
part of what it desired, unable to contend alone with its quon- 
dam allies. Prussia, greedy for Saxony, must rest satisfied 
with a partial payment of its demand notes ; but greatly strength- 
ened by an increase of territory and recognition it entered upon 
a career which has made it long the arbiter of Europe in peace. 
A number of states were set aside, neutralized, or placed under 
tliis or that Power, with a freedom and assurance which shake 
one's faith in statesmanship. Belgium and Holland formed a 
buffer state till 1838. The Duchy of Warsaw touched upon 
three of the powers, as prize for the most unscrupulous or the 
most chivalric. Poland is a synonym for oppression and con- 
tinuous upheaval. The Principalities — the Balkan provinces- 
it is only necessary to mention them to raise the memory of 
contention as yet unended. The doctrine of inferior races has 
been a godsend to the statesman who seeks to establish an equi- 
librium of force in Europe — the theory long upheld by force of 
a balance of power,^^ the source of uncounted evils to all con- 
cerned. These small weights in the balance thrown from one 



^* See C. P. Adams, The Monroe Doctrine and Mommsen's Law (Bos- 
ton, 1914). 

[102] 



The Treaty of Ghent, and After 

scale to the other have been productive of more international 
differences than a century can heal. 

The vicious principle existed long before the Congress of 
Vienna; by accepting it new life was infused into the exhausted 
powers of the Continent, a life to be devoted to building up of 
rival nationalities, of machines of destruction, appalling by 
their size, momentum, and possibilities. To place any people 
under a. complicated, artificial government, dependent upon the 
good will and interested oversight of two or more strong powers, 
is to plant the seeds of discord. The loyalty and the prudence 
of the powers are subjected to constant temptation to interfere ; 
and the controlled race feels its subjection as a badge of slavery 
and an opportunity for injustice. That was the leading prin- 
ciple of the Congress of Vienna — the weak must receive their 
law from the strong. At subsequent times Belgium, Switzer- 
land, and Luxemburg have been declared ''perpetually neut- 
ral ' ', and in much less than a century the neutrality of two has 
been violated. No European guarantee has sufficed to maintain 
such arrangements disinterestedly and justly — no matter 
whether the guarantee comes from three or from all tlie great 
powers. Tlie thirty-eight German governments of 1814 became 
practically one in 1871, strong enough to challenge the question 
of national development in every direction — save in America. 

The Vienna Congress was the first of a succession of like con- 
ferences but the idea is ever the same. The one break in the 
series was in the autumn of 1815, when the three continental 
powers — Russia, Austria, and Prussia — formed the Holy Alli- 
ance, so named because the founders proclaimed that "alike in 
the government of their own monarchies and in their political 
relations with other States, their conduct would be absolutely 
regulated by the principles of the Christian religion ".^° It 
embodied an act of sincerity on the part of the Emperor of Rus- 
sia, but raised a smile in others, who had their joke about the 
"diplomatic apocalypse", the mysticism of Alexander. The 
propensities of worldly power defeated the good intention of the 
founder of the Alliance. The practice was contrary to the de- 
claration of principle, and influenced America eight years later 



'•" Camhriflge Modern. History. IX, 065. The text of the treaty is iu 
the EncycloiHidia Britannica, XIII, 621. 

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when these practices induced the framing of the Monroe Doe- 
trine. 

The policy of Europe since 1815 has rested upon a theory of 
the utility of small states — situated between the great powers, 
or created temporarily to defeat the ambitious schemes of any 
one or more. And this is the policy Great Britain sought at 
Ghent to introduce into America. A large territory, covering 
what is now composed of the states of Michigan, Illinois, and a 
part of Ohio, was to be set apart as a permanent barrier between 
the western settlements of the United States and the possessions 
of Great Britain. This reservation was not finally to be ac- 
quired either by the United States or by Great Britain, but only 
by a third party.^^ No one could name the third party — 
the possible owner of this domain; but that is not necessary 
to the story. To protect its Canadian possession from a 
possible attack from the United States, the statesmen of Eng- 
land trained in European schools alone, could see no bet- 
ter means than to erect a buffer state between the two, a terri- 
tory then inhabited by a people who had no rights in interna- 
tional law, and whose future, except towards disappearance, 
could not have been so much as outlined. Only one phase of 
the quality of such a reservation could be seen with certainty — 
that it would have been a constant source of trouble, expense, 
and war. A like situation on the South had demonstrated and 
was to demonstrate that ; but Louisiana had been purchased and 
Jackson was yet to march his force into Florida as into a coun- 
try with which the United States was at war. For an American 
general to march into this reservation proposed at Ghent would 
be followed by very different results. Spain was not Great 
Britain, and the British were then at the height of their tri- 
umph — the recognized masters of the sea. 

To the introduction of this source of trouble the American ne- 
gotiators at Ghent gave a flat refusal. That principle of Euro- 



'"' Only seven years later Chief Justice Marshall authoritatively 
stated that the Indians "and their country are considered by foreign 
nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so completely under the sov- 
ereignty and dominion of the United States that any attempt to ac- 
quire their lands or to form a political connection with them would be 
considered by all as an invasion of our territory and an act of hostility." 
Cherokee Nation vs. State of Georgia, 5 Peters, 1. 

[104] 



The Treaty of Ghent, and After 

pean policy should have no place in North America. It would 
have forced the United States to become a military nation, and 
again and again to have invaded Canada in the hope of elimi- 
nating such a fruitful source of discord. The Briiitish partial- 
ity for small or buffer states in America continued in favor. 
She waged the War of 1812 in the hope of dividing the Union, 
and she counted upon controlling one of the two or more sec- 
tions into which it seemed likely to fall. Her statesmen were 
opposed to our annexation of Texas, urging Mexico to recognize 
the independence of that province, and willing to defend that in- 
dependence against aggression from the North. Texas would 
serve as a buffer state, a protest against slavery, a source of cot- 
ton and commercial rivalry, a thorn in the side of both Mexico 
and the United States. In the War of Secession the govern- 
ments of England and of Prance saw no possibility of a restored 
Union, and awaited with a resignation that was tempered by 
expectancy for the division which would destroy forever the 
one great power of the West. Fortunately the policy of the 
Congress of Vienna, the policy of European diplomacy, never 
rested on the American continent — the deliberate creation of 
artificial and temporary states weak and at difference, certain 
to be fought for at some opportunity. 

Against it we set the American doctrine of conterminous 
states and provinces, cultivating good relations and recognizing 
mutual benefits. True, it is easier to deal with virgin territory ; 
though the Indian frontier, steadily moving westward, proved 
a difficult problem of administration, and seemed to favor reser- 
vations on the European plan ; but at no time has it been neces- 
sary to set apart a strip of so-called neutral territory along our 
boundary, and the nearest approach to such a strip, the free cus- 
toms zone between the United States and Mexico, a commercial 
privilege, proved a source of constant friction. There have 
been border wars among the states ; Rhode Island remained out 
of the Union till the realization of the disadvantage compelled 
her to enter; there have been dreams of annexing Canada, of 
impounding to the Isthmus, as well as extensions of the Monroe 
doctrine to questionable uses. Manifest destiny is a phrase to 
conjure with; but behind all this froth lies the firmly rooted 
principle of union within and friendly relations without which 
has safeguarded the country from disunion in any form, and 

[ 105 ] 



Wisconsin Historical Society 

from a jealousy of the development of other continental powers. 
Ghent strengthened the principle by rejecting Europe's pet plan 
of control, and by providing for mutual disarmament on the 
Lakes. In consequence there has been a century of peace with 
Europe, a century of growth and consolidation at the usual 
price, and an ever increasing general recognition of power, mor- 
al as well as physical, half-heartedly, somewhat ungraciously 
conceded, yet effective, and now of supreme import in the 
world's disorder. 



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